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Abstract. Ethical and explainable artificial intelligence is an interdisciplinary
research area involving computer science, philosophy, logic, the social sciences,
etc. For an ethical autonomous system, the ability to justify and explain its deci-
sion making is a crucial aspect of transparency and trustworthiness. This paper
takes a Value Driven Agent (VDA) as an example, explicitly representing im-
plicit knowledge of a machine learning-based autonomous agent and using this
formalism to justify and explain the decisions of the agent. For this purpose, we
introduce a novel formalism to describe the intrinsic knowledge and solutions of
a VDA in each situation. Based on this formalism, we formulate an approach to
justify and explain the decision-making process of a VDA, in terms of a typical
argumentation formalism, Assumption-based Argumentation (ABA). As a result,
a VDA in a given situation is mapped onto an argumentation framework in which
arguments are defined by the notion of deduction. Justified actions with respect
to semantics from argumentation correspond to solutions of the VDA. The accep-
tance (rejection) of arguments and their premises in the framework provides an
explanation for why an action was selected (or not). Furthermore, we go beyond
the existing version of VDA, considering not only practical reasoning, but also
epistemic reasoning, such that the inconsistency of knowledge of the VDA can
be identified, handled and explained.
1 Introduction
Ethical, explainable artificial intelligence is an increasingly active research area in re-
cent years. An autonomous agent should make decisions by determining ethically prefer-
able behavior [1,?]. Further, it is expected to provide explanations to human beings
about how and why the decisions are made [2]. Explainable AI is an interdisciplinary re-
search direction, involving computer science, philosophy, cognitive psychology/science,
and social psychology [3]. In recent years, different approaches have been proposed to
provide explanations for autonomous systems, though most of them are still rather pre-
liminary. For instance, [4] proposed an architecture combining Artificial Neural Net-
works and argumentation for solving binary classification problems, [5] introduced an
approach for explaining Bayesian network classifiers such that the classifiers are com-
piled into decision functions that have a tractable and symbolic form, and [6] proposed
a human explanation model based on conversational data.
While there are various types of explanations such as trace, justification and strategy,
according to the empirical results reported in [7], justification is the most effective type
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of explanation to bring about changes in user attitudes toward the system. In order to
provide a justification, one needs to first have a formal representation of the knowledge
that is used in the process of decision making of an autonomous agent. For a machine
learning-based agent, unfortunately, the formal and logical knowledge may not always
be self-evident. In such cases modeling justification-based explanation entails formally
representing the intrinsic knowledge of the agent to permit its use for justification and
explanation, as exemplified in [4] and [5]. In this paper, we study this methodology by
considering an ethical agent, called a Value Driven Agent (VDA) in [8], focusing on the
following research question.
Research question How can we explicitly represent the implicit knowledge of a VDA
and use it to provide formal justification and explanation for its decision-making?
A VDA, as introduced in next section, uses inductive logic programming techniques
to abstract a principle from a set of cases, and a decision tree to determine the ethical
consequences of each action in the current situation. Interestingly, there exists untapped
implicit knowledge that can help provide an account as to why a VDA determines an
action is considered ethically preferable.
In existing literature, there are a number works on value-based practical reasoning,
e.g. [9] and [10], which are related to the ethical decision-making of a VDA. However,
the existing work has not considered how preferences over actions can be induced from
cases, nor how a logic-based formalism can be integrated with a machine leaning based
approach.
In addition, concerning the combination of machine leaning-based approaches and
formal logic-based approaches, while some existing works are mainly for explaining
classification, e.g. [4] and [5], we are more interested in a system that can reason about
the state of the world, the actions of a VDA, and the ethical consequences of the actions.
With these ideas in mind, in this paper, we study an explainable VDA by exploiting
formal argumentation. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls some
required basic notions in existing literature. Section 3 introduces a formalism for repre-
senting knowledge of a value driven agent. In Section 4, we present an argumentation-
based justification and explanation approach. In section 5, we discuss related work.
Finally, we offer our conclusions in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some basic notions required for understanding what fol-
lows, including those about Value Driven Agents and formal argumentation.
2.1 Value Driven Agent
According to [8], A VDA is defined as an autonomous agent that decides its next action
using an ethical preference relation over actions, termed a principle, that is abstracted
from a set of cases using inductive logic programming techniques. A case-supported,
principle based approach (CPB) uses a representation scheme that includes ethically
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relevant features (e.g. harm, good, etc.) and their incumbent prima facie duties to either
minimize or maximize them (e.g. minimize harm, maximize good), actions character-
ized by integer degrees of presence or absence of ethically relevant features (and so,
indirectly, the duties it satisfies or violates), and cases comprised of the differences of
the corresponding duty satisfaction/violation degrees of two possible actions where one
is ethically preferable to the other.
A principle of ethical preference is defined as a disjunctive normal form predicate
in terms of lower bounds for duty differentials of a case.
ppa1, a2q ÐÝ
∆d1 ą“ v1,1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^∆dn ą“ vn,1
_
...
_
∆d1 ą“ v1,m ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^∆dn ą“ vn,m
where ∆di denotes the difference of a corresponding values of duty i in actions a1
and a2 (the actions of the case in question) and vi,j denotes the lower bound of duty i in
disjunct j such that ppa1, a2q returns true if action a1 is ethically preferable to action a2.
Inductive logic programming (ILP) techniques are used to abstract principles from
judgments of ethicists on specific two-action cases where a consensus exists as to the
ethically relevant features involved, the relative levels of satisfaction or violation of
their correlative duties, and the action that is considered ethically preferable. These
techniques result in a set of sets of lower bounds for which principle p will return true
for all positive cases presented to it (i.e. where the first action is ethically preferable to
the second) and false for all negative cases (i.e. where the first action is not ethically
preferable to the second). That is, for every positive case, there is a clause of the prin-
ciple that is true for the differential of the actions of the case and, for every negative
case, no clause of the principle returns true for the differential of the actions of the case.
The principle is thus complete and consistent with respect to its training cases. Further,
as each set of lower bounds is a specialization of the set of minimal lower bounds suf-
ficient to uncover negative cases, each clause of the principle may inductively cover
positive cases other than those used in its training.
A general ethical dilemma analyzer, GenEth [11], has been developed that, through
a dialog with ethicists, helps codify ethical principles in any domain. GenEth uses ILP
[12] to infer a principle of ethical action preference from cases that is complete and con-
sistent in relation to these cases. As cases are presented to the system, duties and ranges
of satisfaction/violation values are determined in GenEth through resolution of contra-
dictions that arise, constructing a concrete representation language that makes explicit
features, their possible degrees of presence or absence, duties to maximize or minimize
them, and their possible degrees of satisfaction or violation. Ethical preference is de-
termined from differences of satisfaction/violation values of the corresponding duties
of two actions of a case. GenEth abstracts a principle of ethical preference ppa1, a2q
by incrementally raising selected lower bounds (all initially set at their lowest possible
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value) so that this principle no longer returns true for any negative cases (cases in which
a2 is preferable to a1) while still returning true for all positive cases (cases in which a1
is preferable to a2).
To use this principle to determine a VDA’s next action, it is necessary to associate
each of the VDA’s possible actions with a vector of values representing levels of satis-
faction or violation of duties that that action exhibits in the current context. The current
context is represented as a set of Boolean perceptions whose values are determined
from initial input combined with sensor data (such as the fact that it is time to remind a
patient that it is time to take a medication or batteries are in need of recharging). These
values are provided as input to a decision tree (abstracted from input/output examples
provided by the project ethicist) whose output is the duty satisfaction/violation values
appropriate for each action given the context defined by the current Boolean percep-
tions. Given this information, the principle can serve as a comparison function for a
sorting routine that orders actions by ethical preference.
The decision making process of a VDA, then, is as follows: sense the state of the
world and abstract it into a set of Boolean perceptions, determine the vectors of duty sat-
isfaction or violation of all actions with respect to this state using the decision tree, and
sort the actions in order of ethical preference using the principle such that the first action
in the sorted list is the most ethically preferable one. Clearly, several kinds of knowl-
edge of a VDA are implicit, including the relation between perceptions and actions
determined by the decision tree, the ethical consequences of an action (represented by a
vector of duty satisfaction or violation values of the action), disjuncts in the clauses of
the principle that are used to order two actions, and the cases from which these disjuncts
are abstracted. Since these kinds of knowledge are informal and somewhat implicit, the
current version VDA cannot provide explanations about why an action is taken.
Our current implementation is in the domain of eldercare where a robot is tasked
with assisting an elderly person. Its possible actions include: charge the robot’s battery
if low until sufficiently charged; remind the patient that it’s time to take a medication
according to a doctor’s orders, retrieve that medication and bring it to the patient; engage
the patient if the patient has been immobile for a certain period of time; warn the patient
that an overseer will be notified if the patient refuses medication or does not respond
to the robot’s attempt to engage the patient; notify an overseer if there has not been a
positive response to a previous warning; return to a seek task position when no tasks
are required. For further details, readers are referred to [8].
2.2 Formal Argumentation
Formal argumentation or argumentation in AI, is a formalism for representing and rea-
soning with inconsistent and incomplete information [13]. It also provides various ways
for explaining why a claim or a decision is made, in terms of justification, dialogue, and
dispute trees [14].
Intuitively, an argumentation system consists of a set of arguments and an attack
relation over them. Arguments can be constructed from an underlying knowledge base
represented by a logical language, while the attack relation can be defined in terms
of the inconsistency of the underlying knowledge. There are different formalisms for
modeling formal argumentation, such as Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP) [15],
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APSIC` [16], Assumption-based Argumentation (ABA) [17], and Classical Logic-
based Argumentation [18]. In this paper, the acceptance of an ethical consequence spec-
ified by a vector of duty satisfaction/violation can be viewed as an assumption, while
the relations between accepting an ethical consequence and an action, and between ac-
cepting different ethical consequences with respect to a principle, can be represented
by deductive rules. Furthermore, default assumptions in epistemic reasoning can also
be represented by deductive rules with assumptions in their premises. Under these con-
siderations, we may adopt ABA as a formalism for representation. Now, let us first
introduce some notions of ABA under the setting of this paper.
According to [17], an ABA framework is a tuple xL,R,A,Ý y where
– xL,Ry is a deductive system, with L the language, andR a set of rules of the form
σ0 Ð σ1, . . . , σm (m ě 0) with σi P L (i “ 0, . . . ,m);
– A Ď L is a (non-empty) set, referred to as assumptions;
– Ý is a total mapping from A into L; a is referred to as the contrary of a.
Given an ABA framework, arguments can be defined by the notion of deduction. In
terms of [17], a deduction for σ P L supported by T Ď L andR Ď R, denoted T $R σ,
is a (finite) tree with nodes labelled by sentences in L or by τ (when the premise of a
rule applied in the tree is empty), the root labelled by σ, leaves either τ or sentences in
T , non-leaves σ1 with, as children, the elements of the body of some rules in R with
head σ1, and R the set of all such rules. When the context is clear, T $R σ is written
as T $ σ. Then, an argument for (the claim) σ P L supported by A Ď A (A $ σ for
short) is a deduction for σ supported by A (and some R Ď R).
Arguments may attack each other. An argument T1 $ σ1 attacks an argument T2 $
σ2 if and only if σ1 is the contrary of one of the assumptions in T2.
LetAR be a set of arguments constructed from xL,R,A,Ý y, andATT Ď ARˆAR
be the attack relation over AR. A tuple pAR,ATT q is called an abstract argumentation
framework (or AAF in brief). Given an AAF, the notion of argumentation semantics in
[19] can be used to evaluate the status of arguments in AR. There are a number of ar-
gumentation semantics capturing different intuitions and constraints for evaluating the
status of arguments in an AAF, including complete, preferred, grounded and stable, etc.
A set of arguments accepted together is called an extension. Various types of extensions
under different argumentation semantics can be defined in terms of the notion of admis-
sibility of set of arguments, which is in turn in terms of the notions of conflict-freeness
and defense. For E Ď AR, we say that E is conflict-free if and only if there exist no
X1, X2 P E such that X1 attacks X2; E defends an argument X P AR if and only if
for every argument Y P AR if Y attacks X then there exists Z P E such that Z attacks
Y . Set E is admissible if and only if it is conflict-free and defends each argument in E.
Then, we say that:
– E is a complete extension if and only if E is admissible and each argument in AR
defended by E is in E;
– E is a preferred extension if and only if E is a maximal complete extension with
respect to set-inclusion;
– E is the grounded extension if and only if E is a minimal complete extension with
respect to set-inclusion;
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– E is a stable extension if and only if E is conflict-free and for every X P ARzE,
there exists Y P E such that Y attacks X .
Given an AAF pAR,ATT q, we use smpAR,ATT q to denote a set of extensions
of pAR,ATT q under semantics sm P tCo,Pr,Gr,Stu, in which Co, Pr,Gr and St
denote complete, preferred, grounded and stable semantics respetively.
It has been verified that each AAF has a unique (possibly empty) set of grounded
extension, while many AAFs may have multiple sets of extensions under other seman-
tics. When an AAF is acyclic, it has only one extension under all semantics. Then, we
say that an argument of an AAF is skeptically justified under a given semantics if it is
in every extension of the AAF, and credulously justified if it is in at least one but not
all extensions of the AAF. Furthermore, we say that an argument is skeptically (cred-
ulously) rejected if it is attacked by a skeptically (respectively, credulously) justified
argument.
Example 1 (Formal argumentation). To illustrate the above notions, consider a famous
example in nonmonotonic reasoning, called the Nixon diamond, a scenario in which
default assumptions lead to mutually inconsistent conclusions:
– Usually, Quakers are pacifist.
– Usually, Republicans are not pacifist.
– Richard Nixon is both a Quaker and a Republican.
In terms of ABA, letL “ tQuakerpRNq, RepublicanpRNq, pacifistpRNq, pacifistpRNq,
asmppRNq, asm ppRNquwhereRN denotes Richard Nixon,A “ tasmppRNq, asm ppRNqu,
asmppRNq “ pacifistpRNq, asm ppRNq “ pacifistpRNq, andR “ tQuakerpRNq Ð
, RepublicanpRNq Ð, pacifistpRNq Ð QuakerpRNq, asmppRNq, pacifistpRNq Ð
RepublicanpRNq, asm ppRNqu. Then, there are 4 arguments as follows, in which Y4
attacks Y1 and Y3, and Y3 attacks Y2 and Y4, as illustrated in Fig. 1:
– Y1 : tasmppRNqu $ asmppRNq
– Y2 : tasm ppRNqu $ asm ppRNq
– Y3 : tasmppRNqu $ pacifistpRNq
– Y4 : tasm ppRNqu $  pacifistpRNq
Fig. 1. The AAF of the Nixon diamond example.
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Then, under grounded semantics, there is only one extension which is an empty set;
under complete semantics, there are three extensions tY1, Y3u, tY2, Y4u and tu; un-
der stable and preferred semantics, there are two extensions tY1, Y3u and tY2, Y4u. No
argument is skeptically justified under all semantics, all arguments are credulously jus-
tified under all semantics except grounded. For more information about argumentation
semantics, please refer to [20].
3 Representing a value driven agent
In this section, we introduce a formal language and use it to represent the knowledge
and model of a VDA, which lays a foundation for argumentation-based justification and
explanation of the decision-making of a VDA.
The language of a VDA is composed of atoms of perceptions, actions and duties.
Definition 1 (Language of a VDA). Let Atom be a set of atoms of perceptions, and
Sig be a set of signatures. Let L “ pAtom,A, Dq be a language consisting of
– a set of atoms Atom,
– a set of actions A Ď Sig, and
– a set of duties D Ď Sig,
such that A and D are disjoint.
Example 2 (Language of a VDA). In [21], there is a set of 10 atoms of perceptions (de-
noted Atom1): low battery (lb), medication reminder time (mrt), reminded (r), refused
medication (rm), fully charged (fc), no interaction (ni), warned (w), persistent immo-
bility (pi), engaged (e), ignored warning (iw); a set of 6 actions (denoted A1): charge,
remind, engage, warn, notify and seek task; and a set of 7 duties (denoted D1): max-
imize honor commitments (MHC), maximize maintain readiness (MMR), minimize
harm to patient (mH2P), maximize good to patient (MG2P), minimize non-interaction
(mNI), maximize respect autonomy (MRA) and maximize prevent persistent immobil-
ity (MPPI). The language of this VDA is then denoted L1 “ pAtom1, A1, D1q.
The duties enumerated above have been developed by the project ethicist using
GenEth [11] and represent the set needed to drive an eldercare robot in performing the
specified actions as shown in [21].
Let Lit “ Atom Y t p | p P Atomu be a set of literals. For l1, l2 P L, we write
l1 “ ´l2 just in case l1 “  l2 or l2 “  l1. Let P Ď Atom be a set of true perceptions.
Then, the state of the world can be defined in terms of P , called a situation in this paper,
as follows.
Definition 2 (Situation). A situation S is a subset of Lit, such that S “ P Yt p | p P
AtomzP u. The set of situations is denoted as SIT .
Example 3 (Situation). Let Lit1 “ Atom1 Y t p | p P Atom1u be a set of literals,
which can be extended when a VDA becomes more sophisticated. See Section 4 for
details. Let P1 “ tmrt, r, rm, fcu be a set of true perceptions. An example of the state
of the world: S1 “ t lb,mrt, r, rm, fc,  ni,  w,  pi,  e,  iwu.
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Situation S determines the satisfaction and/or violation degree of duties D by ac-
tions A. In each situation, all duty satisfaction/violation values for each action are de-
termined by a decision tree using the perceptions of the situation as input. A set of
vectors of duty satisfaction/violation values of all actions in a situation is called an ac-
tion matrix. The decision tree is derived from a set of known situation/action matrix
pairs.
Definition 3 (Action matrix of a situation). A duty satisfaction value is a positive
integer, while a duty violation value is a negative integer. In addition, if a duty is neither
satisfied nor violated by the action, the value is zero. Given an action α P A and a
situation S P SIT , a vector of duty satisfaction/violation values for α, denoted as
vSpαq, is a vector vSpαq “ pd1 : vS,αpd1q, . . . , dn : vS,αpdnqq where vS,αpdiq is the
satisfaction/violation value of di P D w.r.t α in S. Then, an action matrix of a situation
S is defined as MS “ tvSpαq | α P Au. The set of action matrices of all situations
SIT is denoted as MSIT “ tMS | S P SIT u.
In this definition, a vector of duty satisfaction/violation values represents the eth-
ical consequences of its corresponding action in a given situation. An action’s ethical
consequences are denoted by how much its execution will satisfy or violate each duty.
Conflicts arising between actions will be resolved by a principle abstracted from cases.
For brevity, when the order of duties is clear, vSpαq “ pd1 : vS,αpd1q, . . . , dn :
vS,αpdnqq is also written as vSpαq “ pvS,αpd1q, . . . , vS,αpdnqq.
Example 4 (Action matrix of a situation). Given a state of the world S1 (as denoted in
Example 3), derived as described in [21], the action matrix of S1 isMS1 “ tvS1pchargeq,
vS1premindq, vS1pengageq, vS1pwarnq, vS1pnotifyq, vS1pseekTaskqu, where
vS1pchargeq “ p0, 1,´1,´1, 0, 0, 0q,
vS1premindq “ p´1,´1,´1,´1, 0, 0, 0q,
vS1pengageq “ p0,´1,´1,´1, 0, 0, 0q,
vS1pwarnq “ p0, 0, 1,´1, 0,´1, 0q,
vS1pnotifyq “ p0, 0, 1,´1, 0,´2, 0q,
vS1pseekTaskq “ p0,´1,´1, 1, 0, 0, 0q.
The duties in each vector are MHC, MMR, mH2P, MG2P, mNI, MRA and MPPI
in order. Each duty satisfaction/violation vector denotes how much the associated ac-
tion satisfies or violates each of these duties, positive values representing satisfaction
(1=some, 2=much) and negative values representing violation (-1=some, -2=much).
The value 0 denotes that an action neither satisfies nor violates a duty. For example,
the vector vS1pchargeq specifies that under situation S1, action charge satisfies Maxi-
mize Maintain Readiness with degree 1, while violating Minimize Harm to Patient and
Maximize Good to Patient with degree 1.
For readability, this can also be presented in tabular form:
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MHC MMR mH2P MG2P mNI MRA MPPI
charge 0 1 -1 -1 0 0 0
remind -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0
engage 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0
warn 0 0 1 -1 0 -1 0
notify 0 0 1 -1 0 -2 0
seekTask 0 -1 -1 1 0 0 0
Given a situation and its corresponding action matrix, actions can be sorted in order
of ethical preference using a principle abstracted from a set of cases by applying ILP
techniques. Clauses of the principle specify learned lower bounds of the differentials
between corresponding duties of any two actions that must be met or exceeded to satisfy
the clause.
Let vSpα1q “ pd1 : vS,α1pd1q, . . . , dn : vS,α1pdnqq and vSpα2q “ pd1 : vS,α2pd1q,
. . . , dn : vS,α2pdnqq be vectors of duty satisfaction/violation values. In the following
definitions, we use w “ vSpα1q ´ vSpα2q “ pd1 : wpd1q, . . . , dn : wpdnqq to denote a
vector of the differentials of vSpα1q and vSpα2q, wherewpd1q “ vS,α1pd1q´vS,α2pd1q,
. . . , wpdnq “ vS,α1pdnq ´ vS,α2pdnq.
By considering a set of cases, we may obtain a set of vectors of acceptable lower
bounds of satisfaction/violation degree differentials such that all positive cases meet or
exceed the lower bounds of some vector, while no negative case does.
Definition 4 (Principle). A principle is defined as pi “ tu1, . . . , uku, where ui “ pd1 :
uipd1q, ..., dn : uipdnqq, where dj is a duty, and uipdjq is the acceptable lower bound
of the differentials between corresponding duties of two actions in A.
Intuitively, each ui of a principle is a collection of values denoting how much more
an action must, at least, satisfy each duty (or how much, at most, it can violate each
duty) than another action for it to be considered the ethically preferable of the pair. As
duties are not necessarily equally weighted nor form a weighted hierarchy, principle pi
is required to determine which duty (or set of duties) is (are) paramount in the current
context. For brevity, when the order of duties is clear, in a principle the lower bounds
of the differentials between duties is also written as ui “ puipd1q, ..., uipdnqq.
Example 5 (Principle). According to [21], we have pi1 “ tu1, . . . , u10u where
u1 “ p´1,´4,´4,´2,´4,´4, 2q,
u2 “ p´1,´4,´4,´2, 0, 0, 1q,
u3 “ p0,´3, 0,´1, 0, 1, 0q,
u4 “ p0,´3, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0q,
u5 “ p0,´1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0q,
u6 “ p0,´3, 0,´1, 1,´1, 0q,
u7 “ p´1,´4, 1,´2,´4,´4, 0q,
u8 “ p1,´3, 0,´2,´4,´4, 0q,
u9 “ p0, 3, 0,´2, 0, 0, 0q,
u10 “ p´1,´4, 1,´1,´4,´4,´1q.
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The 10 elements in pi1 correspond to 10 disjuncts of the principle ppa1, a2q in [21].
Each disjunct of the principle specifies a relationship between duties of an ordered pair
actions that, if held, establishes that the first action of the pair (a1) is ethically preferable
to the second (a2). For example, u1 states that action a1 is ethical preferable to action
a2 if: a2 satisfies Maximize Honor Commitments no more that 1 more than a1 (or a1
violates it no more that 1 more than a2), a2 satisfies Maximize Good to Patient no more
that 2 more than a1 (or a1 violates it no more that 2 more than a2), and a1 satisfies
Maximize Prevent Persistent Immobility by at least 2 more than a2 (or a2 violates it
by at least 2 more than a1). As the lower bounds of disjunct u1 for each other duty are
minimal (i.e. it is not possible given the current ranges of duty satisfaction/violation
values to generate a value lower), any relationship between the values of each action is
acceptable.
In tabular form:
MHC MMR mH2P MG2P mNI MRA MPPI
u1 -1 -4 -4 -2 -4 -4 2
u2 -1 -4 -4 -2 0 0 1
u3 0 -3 0 -1 0 1 0
u4 0 -3 0 1 0 0 0
u5 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0
u6 0 -3 0 -1 1 -1 0
u7 -1 -4 1 -2 -4 -4 0
u8 1 -3 0 -2 -4 -4 0
u9 0 3 0 -2 0 0 0
u10 -1 -4 1 -1 -4 -4 -1
Given a principle and two vectors of duty satisfaction/violation values, we may
define a notion of ethical preference over actions.
Definition 5 (Ethical preference over actions). Given a principle pi, a situation S, and
two actions α1 and α2, let w be the differentials of vSpα1q and vSpα2q as mentioned
above. We say that α1 is ethically preferable (or equal) to α2 with respect to some u P pi,
written as vSpα1q ěu vSpα2q, if and only if for each di : wpdiq in w and di : updiq in
u, it holds that wpdiq ě updiq.
In this definition, we make explicit the disjuncts puq in the clause of the principle
that are used to order two actions.
Given two actions α1 and α2, there might exist two different clauses of pi, say
u1, u2 P pi, such that vSpα1q ěu vSpα2q and vSpα2q ěu1 vSpα1q where u, u1 P pi and
u ‰ u1. In this case, we say that neither action α1 nor action α2 is ethically preferable
to the other. In other words, according to the principle, there is no ethical justification
to choose one over the other.
Based on the above notions, a value driven agent (VDA) is formally defined as
follows.
Definition 6 (Value driven agent). A value driven agent is a tuple Ag “ pL, SIT ,
MSIT , piq where L “ pAtom, A,Dq.
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Example 6 (Value driven agent). According to the above examples, we have Ag1 “
pL1, SIT1, MSIT1 , pi1q where SIT1 contains S1 and MSIT1 contains MS1 .
In a VDA, given a situation and an action matrix, a set of solutions can be defined
as follows.
Definition 7 (Solution). Let Ag “ pL, SIT,MSIT , piq be a value driven agent, where
L “ pAtom,A,Dq. Given a situation S P SIT and an action matrix MS P MSIT , a
solution of Ag with respect to S is α P A if and only if there is an ordering of MS with
respect to pi such that vSpαq is the first in that ordering. The set of all solutions of Ag
with respect to S is denoted as solpAg,MS , piq “ tα P A | α is a solution of Ag w.r.t.
Su.
Example 7 (Solution). Given Ag1 “ pL1, SIT1, MSIT1 , pi1q, S1 and MS1 , there is
a unique ordering of MS1 with respect to pi1: vS1pwarnq ěu5 vS1pnotifyq ěu7
vS1pseekTaskq ěu4 vS1pchargeq ěu5{u8 vS1pengageq ěu5{u8 vS1premindq. So,
Ag1 has only one solution warn.
According to Definition 7, we directly have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (The number of solutions). Given Ag “ pL, SIT,MSIT , piq, a situa-
tion S P SIT and an action matrixMS PMSIT , there are k solutions ofAg if and only
if there are k different orderings of MS with respect to pi such that in each ordering the
first element is different from the ones in all other orderings.
In summarizing this section, we may conclude that the formal model of a VDA
properly captures the underlying knowledge of a VDA, and, to our knowledge, is the
first such formalization. It lays the foundation for developing a methodology for justi-
fying and explaining the decision-making of a VDA.
4 Argumentation-based justification and explanation
4.1 ABA-based argumentation systems of a VDA
As described in the previous section, in a VDA, a decision is made by checking whether
there is an ordering over the set of actions according to the ethical preference relations.
However, it is not clear how the ethical consequences of various actions affect each
other, nor how the disjuncts of the principle determine the ordering of ethical conse-
quences of actions. In this paper, we exploit Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA)
for the justification and explanation of the decision-making of a VDA by considering
these factors. Furthermore, we go beyond the existing version of VDA, considering not
only practical reasoning, but also epistemic reasoning, such that the inconsistency of
knowledge can be identified and properly handled.
With the above considerations in mind, an ABA-based argumentation system for
practical reasoning of a VDA under a situation S is defined as follows.
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Definition 8 (ABA-based argumentation system for practical reasoning of a VDA).
Let Ag “ pL, SIT , MSIT , piq be a value driven agent, where L “ pAtom,A,Dq.
Given a situation S P SIT , the ABA-based argumentation system of Ag for practical
reasoning is denoted as xLAg,S ,RAg,S ,AAg,S ,Ý y, where
– LAg,S “ pi YMS Y t φ | φ PMSu YA;
– each element in RAg,S belongs to one of the following types of rules:
‚ action rules of the form α Ð vSpαq, where α P A is an action, vSpαq P MS
is a vector of the duty satisfaction/violation values of α in the situation S such
that there exists di : vS,αpdiq such that vS,αpdiq ě 1;
‚ principle rules of the form  vSpβq Ð u, vSpαq, such that vSpαq ěu vSpβq
where u P pi, and α, β P A;
– AAg,S ĎMS;
– Ý is a total mapping from AAg,S into LAg,S , such that for all vSpαq P AAg,S ,
vSpαq “def  vSpαq.
The items in Definition 8 are explained as follows.
First, the language of argumentation for practical reasoning is composed of the set
of disjuncts of a principle, the set of duty satisfaction/violation vectors under a given
situation, and the set of actions. Among them, the first two sets of elements are assump-
tions, in the sense that both the disjuncts of a principle and the ethical consequences
of actions can be attacked. For all vSpαq P MS , we may view vSpαq as a proposition,
meaning that the ethical consequence of α in situation S is acceptable. We use  vSpαq
to indicate that it is not the case that vSpαq holds.
Second, there are two types of rules for practical reasoning of a VDA. An action
rule α Ð vSpαq can be understood as: if the ethical consequence of action α (i.e.
how it would satisfy and/or violate duties) w.r.t. the decision tree, i.e., vSpαq, is accept-
able (i.e. satisfies some duty), then α should be executed. The acceptance of vSpαq is
an assumption, since there might be some other ethical consequences that are more ac-
ceptable according to the principle pi, in the sense that vSpβq ěu vSpαq for some β P A
and u P pi. Action rules can be automatically and dynamically generated and updated
according to the data from a VDA.
Example 8 (Action rule). Continuing Example 4. Given S1, there are four action rules.
r1 : chargeÐ vS1pchargeq.
r2 : warnÐ vS1pwarnq.
r3 : notify Ð vS1pnotifyq.
r4 : seekTask Ð vS1pSeekTaskq.
In general, action rules are constructed only for those actions that satisfy at least one
duty as those that do not are a priori less ethically preferable. In the example, neither
remind nor engage satisfy any duty and, thus, no action rule is generated for either.
Theoretically, it is possible that no action satisfies any duty in a given situation. In that
case, the most preferable action would be among those that violated duties the least so
action rules for all actions would be constructed.
Principle rules can be constructed in terms of the priority relation between two
vectors of duty satisfaction/violation duties with respect to a principle. For all α, β P A,
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if vSpαq ěu vSpβq, then we have a principle rule  vSpβq Ð u, vSpαq, indicating that
if both u and vSpαq are accepted, then it is not the case that vSpβq is acceptable.
Example 9 (Principle rules). Continuing Examples 4 and 5. Given S1, there are six
principle rules.
r5 :  vS1pchargeq Ð u7, vS1pwarnq.
r6 :  vS1pchargeq Ð u7, vS1pnotifyq.
r7 :  vS1pchargeq Ð u4, vS1pseekTaskq.
r8 :  vS1pnotifyq Ð u5, vS1pwarnq.
r9 :  vS1pseekTaskq Ð u7, vS1pwarnq.
r10 :  vS1pseekTaskq Ð u7, vS1pnotifyq.
Third, regarding practical reasoning, for simplicity, we assume that only the ele-
ments in MS may be assumptions.
Example 10 (Assumptions). Continue Example 4. For each duty satisfaction/violation
vector, if at least one duty in the vector is satisfied, then the vector is regarded as an
assumption. So, for practical reasoning of Ag1 under situation S1, we have a set of as-
sumptions denoted asAAg1,S1 “ tvS1pchargeq, vS1pwarnq, vS1pnotifyq, vS1pSeekTaskqu.
Fourth, concerning the contrary of each element inAAg,S , for each vector vSpαq of
duty satisfaction/violation, its contrary is its negation.
In Definitions 8 and 2, we assume that situation S is given, and can be defined di-
rectly by a set of perceptions without epistemic reasoning. However, in many cases,
perceptions are unreliable, and a VDA usually only has incomplete and uncertain in-
formation. To properly capture the state of the world based on a set of perceptions,
epistemic reasoning is needed for inferring implicit knowledge about the world, and for
handling inconsistency of knowledge of a VDA. Corresponding to practical reasoning,
an ABA-based argumentation system for epistemic reasoning is defined as follows.
Definition 9 (ABA-based argumentation system for epistemic reasoning of a VDA).
Let L “ pAtom,A,Dq be the language of a VDA. Let Lit “ AtomYt p | p P Atomu
be the set of literals of the VDA. The ABA-based argumentation system for epistemic
reasoning of the VDA is denoted as xLit,RLit,ALit,Ý y, where
– each element inRLit is an epistemic rule of the form pÐ p1, . . . , pn where p, pi P
Lit;
– ALit Ď Lit;
– Ý is a total mapping from ALit to Lit, such that for all p P ALit, p P Lit.
In this definition, epistemic rules are used to reason about the state of the world.
Consider the following example.
Example 11 (Epistemic rules). In situation S2, let the set of true perceptions be P2 “
tmrt, r, rm, fc, lb, abu, where ab is a new atom being added to Atom1, denoting that
the battery is abnormal. Let Atom2 “ Atom1 Y tabu. In terms Definition 2, S2 “
P2 Y t p | p P Atom2zP2u which is inconsistent if lb (‘low battery’) and fc (‘fully
charged’) cannot hold at the same time. From the perspective of epistemic reasoning,
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some of perceptions can be viewed as assumptions, e.g., ‘low battery’, ‘fully charged’.
Meanwhile, due to incomplete information, assume that ‘battery is not abnormal’. In
addition, it is reasonable that if ‘low battery’ holds then ‘fully charged’ does not hold,
and if ‘fully charged’ holds and the battery is normal then ‘low battery’ does not hold.
Under this setting, we have three epistemic rules for reasoning about assumptions:
r11 :  fc Ð lb, r12 :  lb Ð fc, ab, and r13 : ab Ð. In addition, there are other
epistemic rules corresponding to the facts, including mrt, r, and rm, etc. Since they
have no interactions with assumptions and other rules, for simplicity, they are omitted.
Let Lit2 “ Lit1 Y tab, abu, and RLit2 “ tr11, r12, r13u.
Then, given an ABA-based argumentation system of a VDA under a situation S,
arguments and attacks can be defined as follows.
Definition 10 (Arguments and attacks). Let Ag “ pL, SIT,MSIT , piq be a value
driven agent, where L “ pAtom, A,Dq, xLAg,S ,RAg,S ,AAg,S ,Ý y be an ABA-based
argumentation system for practical reasoning ofAg under a situation S, and xLit,RLit,
ALit,Ý y be an ABA-based argumentation system for epistemic reasoning of Ag. An ar-
gument for σ P LAg,S supported by T Ď AAg,S ( respectively for σ P LLit supported
by T Ď ALit), written as T $ σ, is a deduction for σ supported by T . The conclusion
of T $ σ, denoted conclpT $ σq, is σ. An argument A1 $ σ1 attacks an argument
A2 $ σ2 iff σ1 is the contrary of one of the assumptions in A2.
The set of arguments constructed from xLAg,S ,RAg,S ,AAg,S ,Ý y is denoted as
ARAg,S , and the set of attacks between the arguments inARAg,S is denoted asATTAg,S .
In terms of [19], we call pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq an abstract argumentation framework (or
AAF for short). Respectively, the AAF constructed from xLLit,RLit, ALit,Ý y is de-
noted as pARLit, ATTLitq.
In the remaining part of this section, let us further illustrate the AAFs for practi-
cal reasoning and epistemic reasoning of a VDA. On one hand, the AAF constructed
from xLAg,S ,RAg,S ,AAg,S ,Ý y is about practical reasoning (i.e., selecting ethically
preferable actions), corresponding to the current version of the VDA in [21]. Under this
setting, all perceptions are assumed to be facts. No justification about perceptions is
considered.
Example 12 (AAF for the practical reasoning of a VDA under a given situation). Con-
tinuing Examples 8 and 9. Given xLAg1,S1 ,RAg1,S1 , AAg1,S1 ,Ý y where LAg1,S1 “
pi1 Y MS1 Y t φ | φ P MS1u Y A1, RAg1,S1 “ tr1, . . . , r10u, and AAg1,S1 “
tvS1pchargeq, vS1pwarnq, vS1pnotifyq, vS1pSeekTaskqu, we have the following 10
arguments. Attacks between arguments are visualized in Fig. 2.
X1: tvS1pchargequ $ charge
X2 : tvS1pwarnqu $ warn
X3 : tvS1pnotifyqu $ notify
X4 : tvS1pseekTaskqu $ seekTask
X5 : tu7, vS1pwarnqu $  vS1pchargeq
X6: tu7, vS1pnotifyqu $  vS1pchargeq
X7 : tu4, vS1pseekTaskqu $  vS1pchargeq
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X8 : tu5, vS1pwarnqu $  vS1pnotifyq
X9 : tu7, vS1pwarnqqu $  vS1pseekTaskq
X10 : tu7, vS1pnotifyqu $  vS1pseekTaskq
Fig. 2. An example of an AAF in situation S1 without considering epistemic reasoning.
On the other hand, as mentioned in Example 11, some of perceptions are assump-
tions that can be in conflict: when ‘low battery’ and ‘fully charged’ both hold according
to the observations, there exists a conflict between them. This conflict cannot be iden-
tified when only practical reasoning is considered [21]. The following example intro-
duces an AAF that can be used for identifying the state of the world of a VDA based on
handling the conflicts of its knowledge, i.e., the set of perceptions and epistemic rules.
Example 13 (AAF for the epistemic reasoning of a VDA). In situation S2, givenRLit2 “
tr11, r12, r13u and ALit2 “ tfc, lb, abu, there are the following six arguments for
epistemic reasoning. Attacks between arguments are visualized in Fig.3.
Y1 : tfcu $ fc
Y2 : tlbu $ lb
Y3 : t abu $  ab
Y4 : tlbu $  fc
Y5 : tfc, abu $  lb
Y6 : tu $ ab
Fig. 3. An example of an AAF for epistemic reasoning.
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Note that since the situation S2 is determined by the status of the arguments for
epistemic reasoning (in this example, arguments Y1, . . . , Y6), arguments for practical
reasoning might change accordingly. We will further discuss this issue in next subsec-
tion.
4.2 Argumentation-based justification
In this subsection, we introduce an argumentation-based approach for justifying an ac-
tion and a situation of a VDA. Firstly, corresponding to the existing version of the VDA
in [21], justification is only about actions.
Example 14 (Extensions of an AAF for practical reasoning). Consider the AAF in Fig-
ure 2. It is acyclic and has only one extension under any argumentation semantics, i.e.,
E1 “ tX2, X5, X8, X9u. In this example, all arguments in E are skeptically justified.
Proposition 2 (Unique complete extension). Let Ag “ pL, SIT , MSIT , piq be a
value driven agent, xLAg,S , RAg,S ,AAg,S ,Ý y an ABA-based argumentation system
for practical reasoning of Ag under a situation S, and pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq the AAF
constructed from the argumentation system. If Ag has a unique solution with respect
to S, then pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq has a unique complete extension, which coincides with
the unique grounded extension.
Proof. Let α P A be the unique solution of Ag. Since there is no other ordering such
that a different action (other than α) can be the first action in the sorted list, for all
β P Aztαu, it holds that vSpαq ąu vSpβq for some u P pi. This means that each
argument vSpβq $ β is attacked by vSpαq, u $  vSpβq, which has no attacker.
Let E Ď ARAg,S be the set containing vSpαq $ α and all arguments of the form
vSpαq, u $  vSpβq for all β P Aztαu. It turns out that E is the unique complete
extension of pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq.
Given a set of justified arguments, we may define the set of justified conclusions as
follows.
Definition 11 (Justified conclusion in practical reasoning). Let pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq
be an AAF for practical reasoning, and X P ARAg,S be a skeptically (credulously)
justified argument under a given argumentation semantics. A skeptically (credulously)
justified conclusion is written as conclpXq. We say that conclpXq is a skeptically (cred-
ulously) justified action if and only if the conclusion of X is an action.
Example 15 (Justified conclusions in practical reasoning). According to Example 14,
all elements in E1 are justified conclusions, in which warn is a skeptically justified
action since X2 is skeptically justified and its conclusion is an action.
Now, let us verify that the representation by using argumentation-based approach
is sound and complete under all semantics mentioned above (i.e., complete, grounded,
preferred, stable), in the sense that when a VDA has multiple solutions, each solution
of the VDA corresponds exactly to a credulously justified action of the argumentation
framework; and when a VDA has a unique solution, the solution corresponds to the
unique skeptically justified action of the argumentation framework.
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Proposition 3 (Soundness and completeness of representation). Let Ag “ pL, SIT ,
MSIT , piq be a value driven agent and xLAg,S ,RAg,S ,AAg,S ,Ý y an ABA-based argu-
mentation system for practical reasoning of Ag under a situation S. For all α P A,
it holds that: α is one of the solutions of Ag with respect to S, if and only if α is a
credulously justified action in pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq.
Proof. On one hand, if α is a solution of Ag with respect to S, then there exists an
ordering over A, such that α is the first action of the sorted list. Let X P LAg,S be
the argument with α its conclusion, and of the form vSpαq $ α. For every argument
Y P ARAg,SztXu, if Y is of the form vSpβq, u $  vSpαq for some u P pi, then
since α is the first action of the sorted list, it holds that vSpαq ěu1 vSpβq, and there
exists an argument X 1 of the form vSpαq, u1 $  vSpβq for some u1 P pi. Let E be
the set containing X and all arguments of the form vSpαq, u1 $  vSpβq. Since E is
conflict free, and each attacker ofX andX 1 (i.e., Y ) is attacked byX 1, E is admissible,
and therefore X P E is credulously justified. Since α is the conclusion of X , it is a
credulously justified action in pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq.
On the other hand, if α is a credulously justified action in pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq,
then there exist an argument X P ARAg,S of the form vSpαq $ α and an admissible
set E Ď ARAg,S such that X P E. For every action β P A, if β ‰ α, it is not the
case that vSpβq ąu vSpαq for some u P pi. Otherwise, there exists an argument of the
form vSpβq, u $  vSpαq. As a result, X is not in E. Contradiction. As a result, we
may construct an ordering of actions such that α is the first action in the sorted list.
Therefore, α is a solution of Ag with respect to S.
When α is a unique solution of Ag with respect to S, according to Proposition 2,
pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq has a unique complete extension. Therefore, α is a unique skepti-
cally justified action in pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq.
Secondly, to justify a situation, we use an AAF for epistemic reasoning.
Example 16 (Extensions of an AAF for epistemic reasoning). Consider the AAF in Fig-
ure 3. It is also acyclic and has only one extension under any argumentation seman-
tics, i.e., E2 “ tY2, Y4, Y6u. The set of conclusions of arguments in E2 is denoted as
conclpE2q “ tlb, fc, abu.
Definition 12 (Skeptically justified/rejected assumption in epistemic reasoning).
Let pARLit, ATTLitq be an AAF for epistemic reasoning, and X P ARLit be a skep-
tically justified/rejected argument under a given argumentation semantics. We say that
conclpXq is a skeptically justified/rejected assumption if and only if the conclusion of
X is an assumption.
If every assumption is either skeptically justified or skeptically rejected, then a sit-
uation containing all justified assumptions is skeptical justified.
Definition 13 (Justified situation). Given Atom and Lit, let P Ď Atom be a set of
perceptions, ALit Ď Lit be a set of assumptions, and pARLit, ATTLitq be an AAF
constructed from xLit,RLit,ALit,Ý y. Let AJLit Ď ALit be a set of skeptically justi-
fied assumptions. The set of justified perceptions is P J “ pP zALitq Y AJLit. If every
assumption in ALitzAJLit is skeptically rejected, then there is a skeptically justified sit-
uation SJ “ P J Y t p | p P AtomzP Ju.
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Example 17. Given ALit2 “ tfc, lb, abu and P2 “ tlb,mrt, r, rm, fc, abu, we have
P J2 “ tlb,mrt, r, rm, abu and SJ2 “ tlb,mrt, r, rm, ab, fc, ni, w, pi, e, iwu.
Given SJ2 , MSJ2 is generated dynamically, presented in tabular form as follows.
MHC MMR mH2P MG2P mNI MRA MPPI
charge 0 2 -1 -1 0 0 0
remind -1 -2 -1 -1 0 0 0
engage 0 -2 -1 -1 0 0 0
warn 0 0 1 -1 0 -1 0
notify 0 0 1 -1 0 -2 0
seekTask 0 -1 -1 1 0 0 0
In situation SJ2 , actions rules and principles rules are the same as those in situation
S1 except that the subscript S1 is substituted by SJ2 .
4.3 Argumentation-based explanation
Besides justifying perceptions and actions, argumentation provides a natural way for
explaining why an action is selected or not, by using the notion of justification of argu-
ments and their premises.
Definition 14 (Explanation of a justified action). Let pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq be an AAF,
and X be a skeptically (credulously) justified argument of the form vSpαq $ α under a
given argumentation semantics. The explanation of α being a skeptically (credulously)
justified action is that: the argument vSpαq $ α is in every extension (one of the ex-
tensions) of pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq, which is in turn because the assumption vSpαq is
accepted since it has no attacker or all its attachers are attacked by an argument in
each extension (respectively, the given extension).
Example 18 (Explanation of a justified action). According to Examples 12 and 15, the
explanation of the action warn being a skeptically justified action is as follows.
– X2 “ vS1pwarnq $ warn is in the unique extension E1, because:
– the assumption (ethical consequence) vS1pwarnq “ p0, 0, 1,´1, 0,´1, 0q is ac-
cepted since it has no attacker.
Fig. 4. Explanation for a justified action
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In this example, accepting the ethical consequence vS1pwarnq means that, under
situation S1, warn’s satisfaction of Minimize Harm to Patient with degree 1 overrides
both degree 1 violations of Maximize Good to Patient and Maximize Respect Auton-
omy.
Definition 15 (Explanation of a rejected action). Let pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq be an AAF,
and X of the form vSpαq $ α be a rejected argument under a given argumenta-
tion semantics. The explanation of α being a rejected action is that: the argument
vSpαq $ α is not in any extension of pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq, which is in turn because the
assumption (ethical consequence) vSpαq is not acceptable since in every extension of
pARAg,S , ATTAg,Sq, there is an argument attacking vSpαq $ α, whose premises (the
ethical consequence of another action and a disjunct of the principle) are accepted.
Example 19 (Explanation of a rejected action). The explanation of charge being a
rejected action is as follows.
– The argument X1 “ vS1pchargeq $ charge is not in the unique extension E1, in
that:
– the ethical consequence vS1pchargeq “ p0, 1,´1,´1, 0, 0, 0q is not acceptable,
since X1 “ vS1pchargeq $ charge is attacked by X5 “ u7, vS1pwarnq $
 vS1pchargeq, whose premises (u7 and vS1pwarnq) are accepted.
Fig. 5. Explanation for a rejected action
In this example, the content of the premises of arguments can be used to further
explain the decision. More specifically, given u7 and the ethical consequence depicted
by vS1pwarnq, the ethical consequence depicted by vS1pchargeq is not acceptable,
i.e.,  vS1pchargeq is acceptable. In other words, under situation S1, satisfying “mini-
mize harm to patient” with degree 1 (mH2P:1), even while violating “maximize respect
autonomy” with degree -1 (MRA: -1), is ethically preferable to satisfying “maximize
maintain readiness” with degree 1 (MMR: 1). As both actions violate ”maximize good
to the patient” equally (MG2P: -1), that duty does not help differentiate these actions
and therefore has no role in this explanation.
Concerning the explanation of a justified situation, since only assumptions need to
be justified, we have the following definition.
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Definition 16 (Explanation of a justified situation). The explanation of S being a
skeptically justified situation is that: each l P ALit is skeptically justified or rejected.
In turn, the explanation of a justification/rejection of a literal is similar to that of an
action.
Example 20. SJ2 is a skeptically justified situation because in the set of assumptions
tfc, ab, lbu, fc and  ab are skeptically rejected, and lb is skeptically accepted. The
explanation of skeptical justification and rejection of perceptions is in turn described as
follows (illustrated in Fig 6).
– fc and  ab are skeptically rejected, because the argument supporting fc (respec-
tively,  ab) is attacked by a skeptically accepted argument.
– lb is skeptically justified because the argument supporting lb is defended by two
skeptically accepted arguments Y4 and Y6.
Fig. 6. Explanations for skeptically accepted/rejected assumptions
Besides the above-mentioned approach for explaining why an action is selected or
rejected, we may also use argument-based dialogues to provide explanations [22]. This
is left to future work.
5 Related Work
The work presented in this paper concerns, in the main, how an autonomous agent
makes decisions according to ethical considerations and provides an explanation for
these decisions. In this section, we discuss related work from the perspectives of value/
norm-based reasoning, argumentation-based decision making, and explanations in arti-
ficial intelligence.
Lopez-Sanchez et al. [23] pertains to the use of “moral values” in choosing correct
norms. Using deontic logic, they associate moral values with norms that exhibit them
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and incorporate the relative weights of these values as a factor in calculating which
norms should take precedence. A correlation might be made between what is termed
“moral values” in the cited work and the concept of duties in Anderson et al’s work
[8] but doing so reveals the simplistic manner in which these values are treated. In
[23], values are chosen in an arbitrary manner without the support of consideration
by ethicists and are not likely to form the total order that they assume. Further, the
fact that some actions may satisfy more than one value is not considered nor is the
possibility of actions violating values. Also not considered is the possibility that an
action satisfies or violates a duty more or less than another. Such possible combinations
of different levels of a variety of satisfied and violated duties are likely to require non-
linear means to resolve– this is precisely what the principle formalized in this paper
accomplishes. Lastly, the cited work doesn’t seem to address the core of what we are
trying to accomplish – providing arguments/explanations for chosen actions.
Those who attempt to exploit deontic logic in the service of providing ethical guid-
ance to autonomous systems, (e.g. [24], [25]) cite the transparency of the reasoning
process as a benefit of such an approach. We would argue that, while a trace of deduc-
tive reasoning from premises to a conclusion may be transparent to some, it will forever
remain opaque to others. We maintain that an argumentation approach to explanation
may be more fruitful.
The work reported in this paper shares some similarity with the symbolic approach
introduced in [5], in the sense that some implicit functions of the system are made
explicit by using a symbolic representation. However, rather than translating the func-
tion between a set of features and a classification, we translate several types of implicit
knowledge of a VDA by a logical formalism.
Other related works are those based on argumentation. Among others, Liao et al.
[26] introduce an argumentation-based formalism for representing prioritized norms,
but do not consider the origin of these priorities, while in this paper the priority re-
lation between the ethical consequences of different actions are learned from a set of
cases, guided by the judgement of ethicists. Cocarascu et al. [4] introduce an approach
to construct an AAF in terms of highest ranked features. While sharing some ideas of
developing a methodology of explainable AI by combining argumentation and machine
learning, our approach is specific to machine ethics and connects to a different ma-
chine learning approach and has a different model of argumentation. Baum et al. [2]
study the interplay of machine ethics and machine explainability by using argumenta-
tion. The idea is close to our work, but focuses on a different research setting and has
a different model. Others also focus on developing general approaches for explanation
based on argumentation, e.g., [27]’s work on a new argumentation semantics for giv-
ing explanations to arguments in both Abstract Argumentation and Assumption-based
Argumentation, and [28]’s work on dialectical explanation for argument-based reason-
ing in knowledge-based systems, etc. However, they are not specific to ethical decision
making and explanation.
Last but not least, in the direction of explanation in artificial intelligence, there are
a number of research efforts in recent years. Among them, a recent work by Tim Miller
[3] provides several insights from the social sciences, by considering how people define,
generate, select, evaluate, and present explanations.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed an argumentation-based approach for representation,
justification and explanation of a VDA. The contributions are as follows.
First, we provide a formalism to represent a VDA, making explicit some implicit
knowledge. This lays a foundation for the justification and explanation of reasoning
and decision making in a VDA. To our knowledge, this is the first effort on providing a
formalization for a VDA.
Second, we adapt existing argumentation theory to the setting of a decision making
in a VDA, such that the ethical consequences of actions and clauses of a principle can
be used for decision-making and explanation. Furthermore, we go beyond the existing
version of VDA, considering not only practical reasoning, but also epistemic reasoning,
such that the inconsistency of knowledge of the VDA can be identified, handled and
explained.
Third, unlike existing argumentation systems where formal rules are designed in
advance, in our approach, action rules and principle rules for practical reasoning are
generated and updated at run time in terms of an action matrix and a principle. Thanks
to the graphic nature of an AAF, when the system becomes more complex, there exist
efficient approaches to handle the dynamics of the system, e.g., [29] and [30].
Besides these technical contributions, methodologically, this paper provides a novel
approach for combining symbolic approaches and sub-symbolic approaches, in the
sense that the features learned from data could be used to build the rules for reason-
ing. In this paper, the duty satisfaction/violation vectors and the principle are exploited
to build the knowledge for reasoning, decision-making and explanation.
Due to these contributions, some benefits can be obtained. Clearly, formal justi-
fication and explanation of the behavior of autonomous systems enhances the trans-
parency of such systems. Further, autonomous systems that can argue formally for their
actions are more likely to engender trust in their users than systems without such a ca-
pability. That principle-based systems such as the one detailed in this paper and others
(e.g. [31],[32]) seem to lend themselves readily to explanatory mechanisms adds further
support for the adoption of principles as a formalism to ensure the ethical behavior of
autonomous systems.
Concerning future work, first, we have not identified nor formally represented the
relation between a principle and a set of cases from which the principle is learned. Do-
ing so is likely to provide further information that explains why an action is chosen in
a given situation. Second, in the existing version of VDA [21], multi-agent interaction
[33,34,35] has been considered. The addition of such extensions to the VDA will serve
to extend its capabilities. Third, concerning explanations, it could be interesting to fur-
ther develop our approach by using argument-based dialogues, and the insights from
the social sciences, as pointed in [3].
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